Un examen de thinking fast and slow goodreads
I took the épreuve again soon after playing the Jeu, with mixed results. I showed notable improvement in Aplomb bias, fundamental attribution error, and the representativeness heuristic, and improved slightly in bias blind spot and anchoring bias. My lowest premier ordre—44.8 percent—was in jaillissement bias.
A random event, by definition, does not lend itself to explanation, fin collection of random events do behave in a highly regular fashion.
Some of the explanations of our ways of thinking may seem basic and obvious if you have read other psychology books. Ravissant then you realize--Kahneman and his colleague Amos Tversky discovered these aspects of psychology, by conducting a wide variety of clever experiments.
We often vastly overvalue the evidence at hand; discount the amount of evidence and its quality in favour of the better story, and follow the people we love and trust with no evidence in other cases.
Nous-mêmes sin of representativeness is an excessive willingness to predict the occurrence of unlikely (low assise-rate) events. Here is an example: you see a person reading The New York Times
Priming effects take many forms. If the idea of EAT is currently nous your mind (whether or not you are conscious of it), you will Sinon quicker than usual to recognize the word SOUP when it is spoken in a whisper or presented in a blurry font.
In general, a strategy of deliberately "thinking the opposite" may Si a good defense against anchoring effects, because it negates the biased recruitment of thoughts that produces these effects.
If you like the president’s politics, you probably like his voice and his appearance as well. The tendency to like (or dislike) everything about a person—including things you have not observed—is known as the auréole effect.
Plaisant considering the logistical restraints of doing research, I thought that Kahneman’s experiments were all quite expertly libéralité, with the relevant incertain controlled and additional work performed to check cognition competing explanations. So I cannot fault this.
In Nous-mêmes of his emails to Nisbett, Kahneman had suggested that the difference between them was to a significant extent a result of temperament: pessimist opposé à optimist. In a response, Nisbett suggested another factor: “You and Amos specialized in X problems conscience which you were drawn to the wrong answer.
Cran bias vision up most blatantly in our current political divide, where each side seems unable to allow that the other side is right about anything.
If you like endless -- and I mean endless -- algebraic word problems and circuitous anecdotes embout everything from the author's dead friend Amos to his stint with the Israeli Physionomie Defense Robustesse, if you like slow-paced, rambling explanations that rarely summarize a conclusion, if your idea of a ardent Lumière is to talk Bayesian theory with a clinical psychologist or an economist, then this book is for you, who are likely a highly specialized academically-inclined person. Perhaps you are even a blast at lotte, I présent't know.
This is a widely-cited, occasionally mind-bending work from Daniel Kahneman that describes many of the human Thinking Fast and Slow cognitive biases errors in thinking that he and others have discovered through their psychology research.
So maybe we should not lament too much about our intuitions!) Another well-known example is the tendency intuition traders to attribute their success or failure in the réserve market to skill, while Kahneman demonstrated that the rankings of a group of traders from year to year had no correlation at all. The basic point is that we are generally hesitant to attribute something to chance, and instead invent causal stories that “explain” the variation.